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In this paper I analyse the main strengths and weaknesses of agent-based 
computational models. I first describe how agent-based simulations can 
complement more traditional modelling techniques. Then, I rationalise the main 
theoretical critiques against the use of simulation, which point to the following 
problematic areas: (i) interpretation of the simulation dynamics, (ii) estimation of 
the simulation model, and (iii) generalisation of the results. I show that there exist 
solutions for all these issues. Along the way, I clarify some confounding 
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Introduction 
 
From time to time, it happens that some innovating methodologies are brought in 
the modelling arena, causing great excitements in some researcher, and great 
irritation in others. Probably the last self-proclaimed ‘revolution’ in our discipline 
is the rise of Computational Economics. Among the enthusiast non-practitioners 
for instance stands Richard Freeman (1998, p.19). Talking about the ‘War of the 
Models’ and the need of new tools to compare different labour market institutions,  
he put great hopes in some of the techniques at the intersection of Evolutionary 
Economics, Computer Science and Cognitive Science: 
 
“Our empirical tools are wonderful for ceteris paribus problems, but many issues 
regarding labour institutions are mutatis mutandis problems. Lots of interrelated 
changes with no empirical counter-factuals. This implies that if we are to make 
progress, we need something more in our tool bag. Game theory? A language and 
framework, but not sufficiently specific. General equilibrium? Too general and 
static. Then what? (…) There are a new set of theoretic and empirical tools that seem 
suited for the problem of analysing labour systems and the War of the Models. The 
tools range from theoretical simulations of nonlinear dynamic systems to a theoretic 
data-mining. Complexity analyses. Neural networks. Data-mining for knowledge 
discovery. Landscape models. Artificial agent simulated societies. Chaos theory. 
Complex adaptive systems. Nonparametric statistical tools of diverse shapes and 
sizes. Cellular automata. The hills are alive with the sound of new tools and jargon”. 
 
True, simulations have been around in Economics for years, although mainly for 
prediction purposes. But they are offer more than that. As Axelrod (1997) puts it, 
«[u]sing simulation for prediction can help validate or improve the model upon 
which the simulation is based. Prediction is the use which most people think of 
when they consider simulation as a scientific technique. But the use of simulation 
for the discovery of new relationships and principles is at least important as proof 
or prediction». Axelrod then cites the classical Schelling’s (1978) model of 
residential tipping as an example of how a simple simulation model may provide Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
«an important insight into a general process»
1, and Conway’s Game of Life 
(Poundstone, 1985) as a demonstration that extremely complex behaviour can 
result from very simple rules. Simulations can also be used in order to test 
economic theories developed with more standard modelling approaches, with 
particular reference to the issues of robustness and the convergence to the 
equilibria, as stressed by Sargent (1993), or for data analysis, where - again with 
Freeman - «they offer nonparametric statistical models for dealing with 
nonlinearities and discovering patterns in large data sets».  
 
Much debate has going on in recent years on the virtues and sins of these 
techniques. In this paper I review the main arguments in favour and against the 
use of agent-based simulation for economic modelling. In particular, I will briefly 
discuss what agent-based simulation models are (section 1) and how they can be 
used for economic modelling (section 2). Then, I will turn to rationalise the 
discontent many economists feel about this methodology. I will thus compare 
agent-based models and analytical models with respect to the issues of 
interpretation of the results (section 3), estimation (section 4) and generalisation 
(section 5). A cross-cutting theme is the relationship between real and simulated 
data. Section 6 summarises and concludes. To my knowledge, the perspective 
adopted is an original contribution, offering a bridge between the simulation 
literature and the more traditional economic modelling culture. 
 
1. Agent-based computational models 
 
As Leigh Tesfatsion (2003), one of the pioneers of this technique in the field, puts 
it, «[a]gent-based computational economics (ACE) is the computational study of 
economies modelled as evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents. ACE 
                                            
1 Note that although agent-based simulation models clearly and heavily rely on the wonders of 
modern computers, it is not correct to characterize them as computer models. Schelling’s model, 
for instance, requires nothing else but a sheet of paper and some buttons.  Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
researchers rely on computational frameworks to study the evolution of 
decentralized market economies under controlled experimental conditions».  
 
In a simulation agents represent the basic entities of the system, or an aggregation 
of basic entities. For instance, individuals, families, vacancies, firms, etc. can all 
be thought of as ‘agents’. The interaction between different agents is regulated by 
a precise schedule. Aggregate behaviour is then reconstructed ‘from the bottom 
up’, i.e. by computing what emerges from the micro-behaviour of the agents. 
Agent-based simulations are modular in nature, and produce results that can be 
explored at different levels of aggregation, while always retaining their micro-
foundation. 
 
Agent-based simulation models have two distinguishing features. One is being 
‘agent-based’, i.e. following a micro approach; the other is being simulation 
models, i.e. following an inductive approach to the discovery of regularities. Both 
features are not peculiar of the methodology. Many analytical models have micro-
foundations, and many simulation models adopt an aggregate perspective, as in 
System Dynamics (Forrester, 1991). However, it is the conjunction of the two 
approaches that defines the methodology, allowing for a great flexibility in the 
design of the model, while avoiding all the problems connected with merely 
aggregate representations of the world (Kirman, 1999, 2001a). Agent-based 
simulation models are a third way between fully flexible but not computable and 
hardly testable literary models (which provide no more than a verbal description 
of the causal relationships behind a given phenomenon) on one side, and more 
transparent but highly simplified analytical models (Ostrom, 1998; Gilbert and 
Terna, 2000). The biggest advantage of ACE models with respect to the analytical 
approach is their flexibility, since the results are computed and need not to be Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
solved analytically. With ACE, the researcher gains almost complete freedom 
about the specification of the interaction structure and the individual behaviour
2.  
 
One of the main purposes for writing an ACE model is the desire to gain 
intuitions on the two-way feedback between the microstructure and the 
macrostructure of a phenomenon of interest (Kirman, 2001b). How is it that 
simple aggregate regularities may arise from individual disorder? Or that a nice 
structure at an individual level may lead to a complete absence of regularity in the 
aggregate? How is it that the complex interaction of very simple individuals may 
lead to surprisingly complicated aggregate dynamics? Or that sophisticated agents 
may be unable to organize themselves in any interesting way? Another, related, 
purpose «is to use ACE frameworks normatively, as computational laboratories 
within which alternative institutions, market designs, and organizational structures 
in general can be studied and tested with regard to their effects on individual 
behaviour and social welfare» (Tesfatsion, 2003). Both concerns relate to the 
importance of interaction  in shaping social structures and individual and 
aggregate dynamics.  
 
2. ACE in practice 
 
Building on Robert Axtell (2000), it is possible to identify three distinct uses of 
agent-based computation in the social sciences, and rank them according to their 
auxiliary nature, with respect to analytical modelling
3. The first use is numerical 
computation of analytical models. Note with Axtell that «[t]here are a variety of 
ways in which formal models resist full analysis. Indeed, it is seemingly only in 
very restrictive circumstances that one ever has a model that is completely 
                                            
2 As it is always the case, this freedom requires caution. With less need to adopt standard 
modelling frameworks, models become less comparable. And a greater dispersion in modelling 
choices leads to a greater variability in the quality of ACE works.    
3 The three categories identified below correspond only partially to Axtell’s. Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
soluble, in the sense that everything of importance about it can be obtained solely 
from analytical manipulations». Situations in which resort to numerical 
computation may prove useful include (a) when a model is not analytically 
soluble for some relevant variable, (b) when a model is stochastic, and the 
empirical distribution of some relevant variable needs to be compared with the 
theoretical one, of which often few moments are known, (c) when a model is 
solved for the equilibrium, but the out-of-equilibrium dynamics are not known. In 
particular, with reference to the last point, it may happen that multiple equilibria 
exist, that the equilibrium or (at least some of) the equilibria are unstable, that 
they are realized only in the very long run. Conversely, it may happen that 
equilibria exist but are not computable. Axtell (2000) provides references and 
examples for each case. Finally, it may be the case that the equilibrium is less 
important than the out-of-equilibrium fluctuations or extreme events.  
 
Clearly, agent-based simulations are not the only way to perform numerical 
computations of a given analytical model. However, they may prove effective and 
simple to implement, especially for models with micro-foundations. The second 
use is testing the robustness of analytical models with respect to departures from 
some of the assumptions. Assumptions may relate to the behaviour of the agents, 
or to the structure of the model. ACE models can easily include bounded 
rationality (Sargent, 1993; Leijonhufvud, 1993; Conlisk, 1996) and heterogeneity 
at an individual level, and investigate variations in the way agents interact with 
each other or with the institutional setting. One important feature of ACE is that in 
considering departures from the assumptions of the reference model, a number of 
different alternatives can be investigated, thus offering intuition towards a 
generalization of the model itself.  
 
The first two uses of ACE models are complementary to mathematical analysis. 
The third use is a substitute, going beyond the existence of an analytical reference 
model. It provides stand-alone simulation models for (a) problems that are 
analytically intractable, or (b) problems for which an analytical solution bears no Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
advantage. The latter may happen when negative results are involved, for 
instance. A simulation may be enough to show that some institution or norm is 
wrong, or does not work in the intended way. Analytical intractability may arise 
when more complicated assumptions are needed, or when the researcher wants to 
investigate the overall effect of a number of mechanisms (each possibly already 
analytically understood in simpler models), at work at the same time. 
 
 
However, many economists remain sceptical about this methodology. Of the two 
characteristics of agent-based simulations, it is not the micro approach that is 
questioned. Actually, for what regards the micro-foundations criticism go the 
other way round from ACE practitioners towards traditional analytical modelling, 
where «[h]eavy reliance is placed on externally imposed coordination devices 
such as fixed decision rules, common knowledge assumptions, representative 
agents, and market equilibrium constraints. Face-to-face interactions among 
economic agents typically play no role or appear in the form of highly stylised 
game interactions» (Tesfatsion, 2003). Rather, the main concern of economic 
orthodoxy is that simulations, as opposed to analytical modelling, “do not prove 
anything”. This claim turns out to target three different problems of agent-based 
simulations. The first one is how to recover the input/output transformation 
function (the reduced form) implied by the simulation model, and is mainly 
relevant at a theoretical level in order to gain a better understanding of the 
behaviour of the system. Only artificial data, i.e. data produced by the simulation 
model itself by varying the parameters, are involved here. The second one is how 
to estimate the structural coefficients, and it is relevant at an empirical level, in 
order to allow comparison of the model with real data. The third one is how to 
ensure that the model will be able to make predictions also for cases that are not in 
the data on which the model is validated. It is directly related to the issue of the 
generalization of the results. The three problems are discussed in the next 
sections.  
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3. Recovering the reduced form 
 
In a micro model, being it an analytical model or a simulation one, the behaviour 
of each agent is completely specified, but generally dependent on the behaviour of 
other agents. This (structural) description of the system is generally not enough. In 
order to gain a full understanding of how the model works, individual and 
aggregate behaviour must be explained in terms of the (exogenous) parameters 
and variables, in a reduced form. Let yi be a vector of dependent individual 
variables,  xi a vector of independent individual variables and Y a vector of 
endogenous aggregate variables. The micro model specifies: 
[1]  yi = s(xi , y-i , Y ; αi) 
 
with y-i , x-i being the vector of (dependent and independent) characteristics for all 
individuals different from i, and αi being the coefficient vector. 
 
By solving an analytical model, if possible, we find the only one reduced form 
corresponding to the structural form of the model, both at an individual and at an 
aggregate level: 
 
[2]  yi = f(xi , x-i ; β) 
Y = F(X ; γ) 
 
with X  = [xi] being the matrix containing the independent variables for all 
individuals, and β and γ being the coefficient vectors. 
 
In a simulation model, these reduced forms remain unknown, and only inductive 
evidence about the input/output transformation implied by the model can be 
collected. In other words, simulations suffer from the problem of stating general 
propositions about the dynamics of the model starting only from point 
observations. Due to this ‘original sin’, simulations are considered to be less Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
general than analytical models. Since scientific explanations are generally defined 
as the derivation of general laws, which are able to replicate the phenomena of 
interests (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948; Hempel, 1965), simulations appear to be 
less ‘scientific’ than analytical models. Note that this is not equivalent to saying 
that simulations are an inductive way of doing science
4. As Axelrod (1997) points 
out, «[s]imulation is a third way of doing science. Like deduction, it starts with a 
set of explicit assumptions. But unlike deduction, it does not prove theorems. 
Instead, a simulation generates data that can be analyzed inductively». Induction 
comes at the moment of explaining the behaviour of the model.  
 
Why is the problem of recovering the reduced form important? After all, we have 
the structural form, which in general has a larger informational content. The fact 
is that, even if a simulation model is able to produce ‘interesting’ dynamics - for 
instance in accordance to some stylised facts - two issues are raised. First, a casual 
explanation of these dynamics, in terms of the simulation inputs, is often useful
5. 
Second, the possibility of the system showing other ‘undesired’ dynamics has to 
be ruled out. The first issue is the problem of interpreting the simulation results; 
the second is the problem of sampling the parameter space. A third problem, 
namely the relevance of the reduced form for estimation purposes, is discussed in 
the next section. 
 
When Axtell (2000) argues that «each run of such a model yields is a sufficiency 
theorem, [yet] a single run does not provide any information on the robustness of 
such theorems», he implicitly refers to the second issue. However, he doesn’t 
                                            
4 actually, they are a form of abductive inference (Leombruni, 2002). The relationship between 
induction, abduction and causal explanation has been extensively investigated in the philosophy of 
science literature, and will not be reviewed here (see for instance Peirce, 1955). 
5 this allows to provide answers to questions like “what happens, in the model, to the 
unemployment rate if we increase the reservation wage?” or, more generally, “which are the 
determinants of the unemployment rate, in the model?” Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
stress that such theorems are hardly useful, if they simply connect ‘point-to-point’ 
inputs to outputs (in this sense they are far from the theorems Axelrod refers to). 
To have more interesting ‘laws’, connecting variation in inputs to variation in 
outputs, an interpretation of the underlying dynamics is needed.  
 
3.1 Interpretation 
Let’s start with the interpretation problem, i.e. how to extract the ‘laws’ governing 
the system from the observed regularities in the simulated data. This amounts to 
find functions g and G and coefficients φ and ϕ that are good proxies for the real 
but unknown functions f and F in [2]: 
 
[3]  yi = h(x , x-i  ; φ) 
Y = H(X  ; ϕ) 
 
Note that the coefficients φ and ϕ are not estimates of the ‘true’ reduced form 
coefficients β and γ.  
 
The use of econometric techniques to approximate the input/output transformation 
function, starting from a number of - somehow designed - artificial experiments is 
indeed a common practice in the computer science literature. The resulting 
regression model is also known as metamodel, response surface, compact model, 
emulator, etc. (Kleijnen, 1998).   
 
In estimating the reduced form on the artificial data, one functional form must of 
course be chosen. Having specified the micro-rules of the artificial world, the 
researcher generally knows which parameters affect the outcome variable of 
interest, even if sometimes, in complicated models, the causal link between inputs 
and outputs may be quite indirect, and thus remain at first unnoticed. Moreover, 
there are methodologies to reconstruct the causal structure from statistical data 
(see for instance Hendry and Krolzig, 2002; Glymour and Cooper, 1999). Of 
course, the final choice of a functional form remains to a certain extent arbitrary, Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
and may lead to very different specifications of the aggregate laws of the system. 
But as long as two different specifications – say g and g’, or G and G’ - provide 
the same description of the dynamics of the model in the relevant range of the 
parameters and the exogenous variables, we should not bother too much about 
which one is closest to the ‘true’ reduced form
6.  
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The corresponding reduced form for equilibrium price is: 
 
[5] 
ε γ γ γ + + + =
+
− + − + −
= W Z
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2 2 0 0  
 
In a simulation model system [4] has no analytical formulation. Thus, the reduced 
form [5] is unknown. However, a number of artificial experiments can be 
designed and performed. Artificial data on inputs (Z and W) and outputs (q and p) 
are collected. Then, after some data mining we could come out with the following 
specification: 
 
[6]  ε ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ + ⋅ + + + = W Z W Z p 3 2 1 0  
 
                                            
6 Here, the distinction between in-sample and out-of-sample values, and the objection that two 
formulations may fit equally well the first, but not the latter, is not meaningful. Any value in the 
relevant range can be included in the artificial experiments. The topic is discussed with reference 
to (structural) model selection in a later section. Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
Finally, after having estimated in our artificial data the parameters ϕ , we have our 
approximation of the reduced form [2]: 
 
[7]  W Z W Z p ⋅ + + + = 3 2 1 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ  
 
Note that this approximation can’t be used for further estimation on real data. It 
has no unknown coefficients. It simply describes how the simulation model 
behaves, for given values of the structural parameters. As such, it can be used to 
assess whether the simulation model is able to mimic the phenomenon of interest, 
by imposing the same metamodel [6] on real data, and comparing the coefficient 
vector ϕ ˆ  estimated on the artificial data with the coefficient vector ϕ ~  estimated 
on the real data.  
 
Now, different coefficient vectors ϕ ˆ  are obtained for different values of the 
structural parameters vectors d and s. Intuition may suggest that we are not far 
from being able to estimate the structural parameters themselves, for instance by 
minimising the distance between ϕ ˆ  and ϕ ~ . I leave a discussion on this topic to a 
dedicated section, while simply anticipating that, if the model is identified, 
estimates for the structural parameters can be obtained. Here, we are still dealing 
with the goal of characterizing the unknown input/output transformation function 
[2]. Which values then should we choose for the structural parameters vectors d 
and s, in performing our simulation experiments? The most immediate answer is: 
their estimates! Plug them in, and keep them constant throughout all simulation 
runs. After all, who cares about the behaviour of the model for implausible values 
of the parameters? All we need is some sensitivity analysis around the estimated 
values of the structural coefficients. Note that the proposed approach involves a 
two-stage procedure, which is exactly the opposite of the standard practice. In 
dealing with analytical models, first comes the derivation of the reduced form, and 
then the estimation of the structural parameters.  
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A second approach allows for a broader description of the true input/output 
transformation function, but requires more computational burden. We may 
express the input/output transformation functions in a different way, including the 
structural parameters α in the specification: 
 
[3’]  yi = g(x , x-i , αi , α-i ; φ’) 
Y = G(X , A ; ϕ’) 
 
with A = [αi] being the matrix of all individual parameters. Then, in the artificial 
experiments variation in the value of the structural parameters is also included. 
However, even in the very simple example provided above, this may lead to a 
highly complicated specification for the metamodel to be estimated in the 
artificial data. 
 
Moreover, when the structural parameters α are included but the structural model 
is not identified, there may be a number of vectors φ’ and  ϕ’ for each given 
specification  g and G, that approximate equally well the real input/output 
transformation implied by the model. 
 
3.2 Robustness 
The second problem concerns the possibility that the artificial data may not be 
representative of all outcomes the model can produce. In other words, it may 
happen that as soon as we move to different values of the parameters, the 
behaviour of the reduced form functions f and F will change dramatically, for 
example exhibiting singularities. The metamodels g and G will then become a 
poor description of the simulated world. While analytical results are conditional 
on the specific hypothesis made about the model only, simulation results are 
conditional both on the specific hypothesis of the model and the specific values of 
the parameters used in the simulation runs.  
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At a theoretical level, this critique can be contrasted with two observations. First, 
if it applies to what we know about the artificial world defined by the simulation 
model, it also applies to what we know about the real world. The real data 
generating process being itself unknown, stylised facts could in principle turn 
wrong, at some point in time. From an epistemological point of view, our belief 
that the sun will rise tomorrow remains a probabilistic assessment. Second, we 
should not worry too much about the behaviour of a model for particular ‘evil’ 
combinations of the parameters, as long as these combinations remain extremely 
rare
7. If the design of the experiments is sufficiently accurate, the problem of how 
‘local’ is the estimated local data generating process becomes marginal. «While 
the curse of dimensionality places a practical upper bound on the size of the 
parameter space that can be checked for robustness, it is also the case that vast 
performance increases in computer hardware are rapidly converting what was 
once perhaps a fatal difficulty into a manageable one» (Axtell, 2000). 
 
4. Estimating the structural coefficients  
 
A second critique of agent-based simulation models is the claim that they often 
cannot be identified in the data. Again, this critique need to be further specified. 
In particular, two different problems seem to be involved. A first issue deals with 
                                            
7 There is one relevant exception when rare events are the focus of the investigation, for instance 
as in risk management (Segre-Tossani, 2003). Here, simulations may prove extremely useful, by 
dispensing from making assumptions - such as the gaussian distribution of some relevant 
parameters - which may be necessary in order to derive analytical results but have unpleasant 
properties – like too thin tails. In a simulation, the reproduction of such rare events is limited only 
by the computational burden imposed to the computer. However, techniques can be used in order 
to artificially increase the likelihood of their occurrence. Particular combinations for the ranges of 
the relevant parameter can often be guessed, and oversampled in the artificial experiments 
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the possibility to recover the structural coefficients from the real data, assuming 
the model is indeed identified. A second issue deals with the claim that ACE 
models tend to be underidentified, due to the fact that they are less parsimonious 
than analytical models (after all, this is their main advantage, ACE guys say) and 
thus they often lack a sufficient number of exclusion restrictions. I now turn to 
contrast both statements. 
 
4.1 Estimation of identified models 
Let’s start with the first one. In an analytical model the reduced form coefficients 
β and γ of eq. [2] can be estimated in the real data. If the model is identified, there 
is a one-to-one relationship between the structural and the reduced form 
coefficients. Thus, estimates for the structural coefficients α can be recovered. In 
a simulation model this can’t be done. However, as already stressed, we could 
compare the outcome of the simulation with the real data, and change the 
structural coefficients values until the distance between the simulation output and 
the real data is minimised. In the simulation literature, this is called calibration. 
More precisely, we could choose some moments of the simulated data, and 
compare them with the moments of the true data: 
 
[8]  () ) ( ) ; ( real Y m Y m L − = ∆ α  
 
where ∆ is the distance to be minimised with respect to α, L is a loss function 
weighting in some way the different moments, and Yreal are the real data on the 
outcome variable of interest. Known as method of simulated moments, this 
approach has been introduced in the econometric literature by McFadden (1989) 
and Pakes and Pollard (1989), and has since then found a number of applications 
for structural models estimation
8. Again, its main limitation lies in the 
computational burden it imposes, when the simulated models take a long time to 
                                            
8 For a general exposition of simulation-based estimation, and a review of applications in the 
empirical literature, see Stern (1997) and Liesenfeld and Breitung (1999) Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
run. However, the increasing power of modern computers, and the use of 
particular techniques to reduce the number of times the model has to be solved 




A further critique says that the richer specifications of simulation models often 
lead to underidentification, due to the lack of exclusion restrictions. This claim 
seems to suggest that analytical models are characterised by lean specifications 
only to avoid the problem of underidentification, and not because of symbolic 
tractability.  
 
Moreover, underidentification should not be the fear number one in writing a 
model. Rather, the inability of a model to provide a good description of the 
underlying phenomenon is a much greater limit. «Economic variables are 
considered by econometricians as mutually dependent, but the degree of 
simultaneity is recognized only to the extent that it does not prevent the structural 
coefficients from being identified. But is there any logical reason why the degree 
of simultaneity must always stop short of causing real troubles? The answer given 
in the literature is that economic theory or a priori information often requires us to 
exclude from a given structural relationship a sufficient number of variables so 
that it become overidentified. […] [Q]uite to the contrary, economic theory 
requires the inclusion of a much larger number of variables than those included in 
the existing models of economic structures. The complexity of modern economic 
societies makes it much more likely that the true structural relationships are 
underidentified rather than overidentified» (Liu, 1960). Simulation allows 
complicating models. This must be considered positively, not negatively, since a 
better description of the phenomena of interest becomes possible. The risk of 
underidentification is often simply unavoidable: analytical models that claim to be 
immune are sometimes only poor models. «When a reasonable structural 
relationship could be obtained either by dropping variables from, or adding Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
variables to, an over-simplified relationship, the complexity of the modern 
economy ensures that the ‘enlarged’ estimate is a closer approximation to reality 
than the two simpler ones. Obviously, the high intercorrelations of the large 
number of explanatory variables so included would almost certainly result in large 
standard errors or even wrong signs for some of the estimated structural 
coefficients. When this happens, the only legitimate conclusion we can draw is 
that the complexity of economic reality and the nature of basic data are such that 
the structural coefficients are really indeterminate. The temptation to omit 
relevant variables until a seemingly reasonable and significant ‘structural 
estimate’ is obtained must be resisted» (ibidem). 
 
5. The challenge of complexity  
 
In the above-mentioned work, Liu referred to the ‘complexity’ of economic 
systems rather loosely. Now, it is somehow ironic that the goal of defining 
complexity seems to be itself ‘complex’. A large literature has investigated what 
complexity means, and which characteristics complex system share
9. Most 
definitions relate it to the property of a system «which makes it difficult to 
formulate its overall behaviour even when given almost complete information 
about its atomic components and their inter-relations» (Edmonds, 1999). The 
difficulty stems from the non-linear relationships between the components of the 
system, and between the microstructure and the macrostructure. A related feature 
is that the system seems to be able to respond in more than one way to its 
environment. As Allen (2001) puts it, «The ‘choice’ in response arises from the 
fact that non-linear processes within the system can potentially amplify 
microscopic heterogeneity hidden within it». ACE enthusiasts often link the future 
of the methodology to the claim that it is best suited for the analysis of non-linear 
complex systems. Since the world is intrinsically non-linear and complex, the 
                                            
9 for a recent survey, seeRichardson and Cilliers, 2001; it may also be interesting to look at Gell-
Mann, 1995, in vol.1, no.1 of Complexity Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
argument goes, ACE should take the centre stage in the modelling arena 
(Goldspink, 2002). Now, it is true that non-linear models often resist 
mathematical analysis, while their implementation in an agent-based simulation 
setting brings little additional cost, with respect to linear models. But non-linear 
models of complex systems generally give raise to a number of problems, which 
may pose severe limits to the possibility of generalising the results. The first one 
is the already mentioned sensitive dependence on initial conditions, i.e. the well-
known ‘butterfly effect’ (the possibility that a butterfly’s wing in brazil may set 
off a tornado in Texas, in Lorenz original words).    A second problem is 
equifinality (Von Bertalanffy, 1969; Richardson, 2002),  i.e. the existence of many 
structural models characterised by the same fit with the real data, but different 
out-of-sample properties. A third problem is overfitting, i.e. the risk of having a 
model that is too complex, and may fit the noise, in addition to the signal in the 
data. The ‘butterfly effect’ challenges the possibility of fitting a reduced 
metamodel on the artificial data, and of estimating the parameters of the structural 
model. Equifinality on the other hand challenges the very possibility of choosing 
an appropriate specification for the structural model. Overfitting is a much 
narrower problem, simply increasing the risk of making a wrong specification 
choice. 
 
5.1 Sensitive dependence on initial conditions 
Complex systems, even when totally deterministic, often appear as “seas of 
disorder with islands of structure” (Gleick, 1987). Even supposing to have a 
model that perfectly reproduces the complex system under investigation, is it 
possible to ‘reduce’ it into an input-output transformation function?. In particular, 
if the system shows sensitive dependence on initial conditions, the exercise to 
write down a reduced form metamodel may become entirely worthless. It may 
simply be impossible to connect inputs to outputs, since any arbitrary small 
difference in inputs may lead to large deviations in outputs. However, it may be 
possible to describe the ‘islands of structure’ of the system, for instance by Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
looking at its invariant sets
10 and attractors
11. The metamodel could then describe 
where the system cannot go, or where it will probably go, instead of trying to 
predict where it will actually go.  
 




A second problem with the ‘butterfly effect’ appears when one tries to estimate 
the structural parameters of the model. As suggested above, this may be done by 
comparing the moments of its invariant distributions with the real data. However, 
since numerical simulations always require some degree of approximation, a 
question arises whether these moments remain sufficiently close to those of the 
‘real’ model. Fortunately, there exist generalised laws of large numbers that 
guarantee that the moments computed from simulations of numerical solutions 
converge to the true moments as the approximation errors of the numerical 
solution converge to zero, for non-linear dynamic systems. Some of them require 
technical conditions that (a) are difficult to check and (b) impose severe 
limitations to the model structure (Doob, 1953, ch. 5). However, recent advances 
                                            
10 An invariant set, A, is a set such that any trajectory, x that starts in A stays in A for all time 
11 An attractor is a closed set A with the following properties: (i) A is an invariant set; (ii) A 
attracts all trajectories that start sufficiently close to it; (iii) there is no proper subset of A that 
satisfies conditions i and ii Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
(Santos and Peralta-Alva, 2003) have established generalised laws that rely on 
much simpler conditions, such as the compactness of the domain and continuity of 
the equilibrium solution.  
 
5.2 Equifinality 
  «[C]omputers offer a solution to the problem of incorporating heterogeneous 
actors and environments, and nonlinear relationships (or effects). Still, the worry 
is that the entire family of such solutions may be trivial, since an infinite number 
of such models could be constructed» (Lansing, 2002). The problem with 
equifinality is that these different non-linear models, equally validated by the real 
data, are in general characterised by totally different out-of-sample dynamics. 
Thus, they cannot be considered equivalent in order to explain the phenomenon of 
interest, and exploit this knowledge for interpreting new events
12. The problem is 
ubiquitous, whenever the system we’re interested in modelling is nonlinear. This 
is in sharp contrast with linear models of linear systems, which exhibit only 
limited deviations for limited departures from the validation set.  
 
The figure below shows this difference. The thick red line between the two 
vertical lines represents real data, taken from an underlying true data generating 
process. The thinner lines represent output from other models that might be 
developed in order to explain the observed data. In case (a), where the underlying 
true model is linear, it is easy to see that the other models deviate only slightly 
and gradually from the true one, for out-of-sample data. «Furthermore, we only 
need to validate our models against limited data to ensure that they are valid for 
all qualitatively similar contexts (in fact we would only require two data points!). 
[…] So, the knowledge contained in our models can be easily transferred to other 
contexts – assuming that the world and our models are linear» (Richardson, 2002). 
In case (b), depicting non-linear competing models of an underlying non-linear 
                                            
12 For a recent discussion about observational equivalence see Hendry (2002) Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
phenomenon, extrapolation from the observed data becomes strongly 
questionable. 
 
Figure 2: Linear models of a linear universe versus nonlinear models of a 





However, some considerations may contribute to a more optimistic picture. First 
of all, the problem applies both to ACE and analytical models. Should we refrain 
from analysing non-linear systems altogether? Clearly not. What is needed is 
simply caution in interpreting the results, together with the adoption of a number 
of different modelling strategies. Building non-linear models in order to reproduce 
some complex behaviour is not totally uninformative. At least, they prove that the 
assumptions of the models are sufficient to replicate that behaviour
13. Other sets 
of assumptions may prove unable to do it, thus adding to these possibility results 
equally important impossibility ones.  
 
5.3 Overfitting 
As I have already mentioned, one common critique of traditional analytical 
models is that they sometimes offer too a poor description of a phenomenon that 
                                            
13 More precisely, the hypothesis are INUS conditions, i.e. Insufficient conditions, Necessary to an 
Unnecessary but Sufficient condition (Leombruni, 2002, citing Mackie, 1962). Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
may be much more rich and complex
14. In other words, they fail to replicate the 
signal that is in the observed data. However, when choosing to enrich the 
specification of the models one can go too far, up to a point in which they become 
too complex, and may replicate not only the signal, but also the noise of the real 
data. The random disturbances in the data used for calibration are then included in 
the model as being meaningful. Overfitting has the same implications of 
equifinality: it can easily lead to totally wrong predictions. The model has no 
general validity; it explains only the data on which it was calibrated. Complex 
models contain more information on observed data, but less information on future 
data.  
 
Fortunately, there are a number of techniques to control for the problem of 
overfitting. The simplest one is cross validation. The observed data are split 
between a calibration set and a validation set. Different specifications for the 
model are estimated on the calibration set. Then, the final choice is made by 
comparing the fit on the validation set. The approach can be generalised by 
considering k partitions of the data. The goodness of fit for each specification is 
computed  k times, taking a different fold to be the validation set, and the 
remaining  k-1 to be the calibration set, each time. The backdrop of cross-
validation is that the resulting model may be worse than what we could get using 
                                            
14 Clearly, this critique does not apply to models whose aim is simply to show the implications of 
specific mechanisms, many of which may be contemporarily at work and contribute to the 
observed behaviour of some real world phenomenon of interest. Two examples that «nearly all 
economists would be glad to have in their list of publications» are cited by Sugden (2000): 
Akerlof’s “The Market for Lemons”, which showed the existence of adverse selection due to 
asymmetrical information, and Schelling’s “Dynamic Models of Segregation”, which showed that 
even a mild preference for living adjacent to one own group may lead to very strict homogeneous 
spatial segregation. As he says, the relevance of these models is to a certain extent independent of 
the need to confront their implications with real data. Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
the whole data set. Other methods involve considering penalties for richer 
specifications. Overall, a combination of good validation and adherence to the 




In this paper I have rationalised the main theoretical critiques that can be moved 
to the use of agent-based computational models. They are sometimes summed-up 
in the claim that “simulations do not prove anything”. Discerning the different 
components of this overall judgement is a first achievement of this work. They 
point to the following problematic areas: (i) interpretation of the simulation 
dynamics, (ii) estimation of the simulation model, and (iii) generalisation of the 
results.  
 
Interpretation of the results has to do with recovering the input/output 
transformation function implicit in the system. In analytical models, this can be 
done by deriving the unique reduced form corresponding to the structural form of 
the model. When the structural form is not explicited algebraically, as in 
simulation models, this is not possible. However, a reduced form can be estimated 
in the artificial data resulting from a number of experiments with the simulation 
model itself. A related problem is the robustness of the estimated reduced form, 
with respect to changes in the values of the inputs. This is often referred to as “the 
curse of dimensionality”, but its relevance has been shown to be limited, due to 
the increasing performances of modern computers, at least if the number of 
structural parameters does not become too large. 
 
The second critique involves the possibility of estimating the structural parameters 
of a simulation model. Since only a proxy for the reduced form can be obtained, 
differently from analytical models it is not possible to exploit the one-to-one 
relationship between the structural and the reduced form parameters, in identified 
models. But other econometric techniques, like the method of simulated moments, Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
can be successfully employed for structural estimation in simulation models. A 
related claim is that agent-based models suffer from underidentification, since 
they allow for richer specifications. After noting that allowing for richer 
specifications does not mean requiring them, it is argued that the risk of 
underidentification is often simply unavoidable: analytical models that claim to be 
immune are sometimes only poor models.  
 
Finally, it is recognized that the use of non-linear models for the analysis of 
complex systems may lead to a problem with respect to the possibility of 
generalizing the results, i.e. applying the model either in out-of-sample data or to 
similar yet different contexts. This is due to a characteristic of non-linear systems 
called equifinality: a number of different structural specifications may lead to the 
same fit in the data, although exhibiting totally different behavior with untested 
inputs. Although theoretically relevant, this problem has not prevented the 
development of many successful models of non-linear systems, both in 
Economics and in many other related fields. The modeler should be aware of the 
problem, and take care in analyzing the results of a simulation model, together 
with comparing the outcome of different modelling strategies. Understanding that 
a set of assumptions is enough to generate some dynamics of interest, or that other 
assumptions are not able to do it, is often a valuable result to start with.   
 
Overall, I believe that this discussion on the limits of agent-based simulation 
models has shown that the methodology is indeed sound and can be valuably 
employed for the analysis of many economic issues. Moreover, this paper should 
have clarified some confounding differences in terminology between the 
computer science and the economic literature. In particular, metamodels  have 
been interpreted as estimated reduced forms (input/output transformation 
functions) of the simulation models on artificial data, while calibration has been 
linked to the estimation of the structural parameters in the real data, without 
recurring to a reduced form of the model.  Matteo Richiardi – The Promises and Perils of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
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